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Abstract:  The  concept  of  instantiation  is  realized  differently  across  a  variety  of  
metaphysical  theories.  A certain realization of the concept in a given theory depends 
on what roles are specified and associated with the concept and its corresponding term 
as well as what entities are suited to fill those roles. In this paper, the classic realization 
of the concept of instantiation in a one-category ontology of abstract particulars or 
tropes is articulated in a novel way and defended against unaddressed objections. 
 
Instantiation is a technical notion with different uses across a variety of philosophical 
theories. It is vague, ambiguous, and indeterminate. Sometimes metaphysicians use 
other terms to pick out a certain realization of the concept such as exemplification,  
participation, inherence, to name a few. My preferred method for resolving this 
indeterminacy is to clarify a realization of the concept of instantiation through a 
specification of the role or roles it plays in a metaphysical theory, following David 
Lewiss  doctrine  of  theoretical  terms  (Lewis  1970).  We  thereby  arrive  at  different  
conceptions of instantiation depending on how we specify the relevant roles associated 
with the term and depending on what entities of our ontology fill those roles.  
In this paper I am concerned with the conception of instantiation that is realized in 
Donald C. Williamss theory of tropes (1953a, 1953b). I call it classical trope theory in 
a bid to set it apart from modern developments of the concept of a trope that I believe 
depart radically from Williamss classic statement of trope theory in the mid-twentieth 
century.1 My aim is to clarify, articulate, and develop what classical trope theorists say 
about instantiation and defend their view against unaddressed objections. 
In classical trope theory, the concept of instantiation is associated with the role of 
a trope being of its kind and the role of analyzing predication of concrete particulars. 
For classical trope theorists, tropes fill both of these roles. As such, there is no 
instantiation-role of relating entities across distinct fundamental categories because, in 
classical trope theory, universals do not compose a fundamental category of being, nor 
are universals instantiated by concrete particulars. Since classical trope theory specifies 
unique roles with unique role-fillers, the concept of instantiation has a unique 
realization in classical trope theory. It is a different conception of instantiation from 
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the conception realized in mainstream variants of realism about universals and other 
metaphysical theories.  
In what follows, I outline the conceptual foundations of classical trope theory, 
correcting misinterpretations where necessary and dealing with problems as they arise. 
I then present a trope-theoretic account of instantiation based on classical trope theory 
and defend it against an objection due to J.P. Moreland (2001). I conclude that this 
trope-theoretic account of instantiation is not subject to damaging criticism and has 
some advantages over rivals (although my treatment of it is not fully complete). Note 
well that I will not argue that it is the superior alternative. This latter consideration is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
1. Classical Trope Theory 
Classical trope theorists posit tropes as members of one fundamental category of 
being. According to this one-category ontology, the categories of abstract universals 
and concrete particulars (substances) are derivative. Concrete particulars are 
mereological sums of concurring tropes, and abstract universals are identical with their 
manifestations in tropes. The concept of a trope, according to classical trope theory, is 
that of an entity that is a nature, is particular, and abstract. The notion of a nature is 
primitive; a trope just is a nature. If tropes are qualitative, they are qualitative natures. 
If tropes are quantitative, they are quantitative natures. It is a substantive question 
whether all tropes at the fundamental level are qualitative or quantitative or both. I 
will put this question to one side, however. Hereafter, I equate nature with 
qualitative nature, knowing full well that all tropes at the fundamental level might be 
physical quantities (for a statement of this view, see Keinänen & Hakkarainen 2014, 
72). There is also a broad sense of qualitative that is contrasted with the non-
qualitativeness or bareness of bare particulars. In this sense every nature is qualitative. 
The examples in this paper are of qualitative natures found in ordinary experience. For 
instance, consider this button. It is blue. For the sake of convenience, let us assume 
that colors are basic. A trope is basic iff it is not composed of further tropes. If a trope 
is basic, it is a simple qualitative nature. If a trope is non-basic, it is a complex 
qualitative nature and it inherits its qualitativeness from its constituents. Thus, the 
blueness of this button, or better, this blueness, is a simple qualitative nature  unum 
simpliciter. 
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A trope is particular just because it fails to obey the identity of indiscernibles, 
namely, necessarily, if x and y perfectly resemble each other intrinsically, then x = y 
(Ehring 2011, 33-35; Williams [1960]1986, 3). If x and y are qualitative natures, the 
identity of indiscernibles says that necessarily, if x and y are duplicate qualitative 
natures, then x = y; therefore, the principle need not introduce talk of respects in 
which x and y resemble each other (note that duplication implies perfect resemblance). 
This blueness is particular because it is possible that there exists a duplicate of this 
blueness, that is, an entity that is perfectly similar to but distinct from this blueness. 
The fact that this blueness is particular is a central claim of every variant of trope 
theory. It is one of the key differences between trope theory and mainstream variants 
of realism about universals. The fact that tropes are particular is fundamental, given 
by primitive distinctness (see Campbell 1990, 56-57; Trettin 2000, 283-84). The 
identity and identity conditions of tropes are also primitive (see Keinänen & 
Hakkarainen 2014).  
A trope is abstract just because it fails to exhaust its content or is merely part of its 
content (Campbell 1990, 2-3; Williams [1960]1986, 3). This blueness is abstract 
because it fails to exhaust its content. If this blueness fails to exhaust its content or is 
merely part of its content, other tropes can be collocated with it at the same content. 
The shape of this button, say, and this blueness occupy the same content. Assuming 
both color and shape are not complex, this blueness and this shape occupy the same 
content without having parts that occupy sub-contents of this content. In contrast, the 
button occupies the same content as this blueness and this shape, but it does so by 
having parts that occupy sub-contents of this content. You can think of these tropes as 
extended  simples.  But  not  all  tropes  are  extended  simples;  there  are  even  cases  of  
tropes that count as unextended complexes (for discussion, see Pickup 2016). To be 
clear, the notion of content is meant to be neutral as to whether the manifold under 
consideration is spatiotemporal, analogously spatiotemporal, immaterial, or some 
compound of these. What is required is nothing more than some topic-neutral 
description of modes of extent using logical concepts of parthood, identity, and 
distinctness. Therefore, this account of abstracta is not committed to a certain theory 
of space and time (it might be committed to a primitive occupation relation or 
predicate, but that would be a categorial matter and not an issue that concerns 
speculative cosmology).2 
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This account of abstracta has at least two advantages within in-house disputes over 
the best characterization of the concept of a trope. First, many trope theorists call 
tropes thin natures (see for instance Hakkarainen & Keinänen 2017, 648; Simons 
2000, 147). However, most of these trope theorists do not explain what thin means. 
It is thus left as a mysterious aspect of tropes. But, as was Williamss original 
intention, the thinness of tropes, in contrast with the grossness of concrete objects, is 
explained in terms of abstractness. Tropes are thin in that tropes are abstract (in the 
sense specified above).3 Second, the abstractness of tropes helps to account for how 
concrete particulars are composed of abstract particulars without creating gap 
challenges that have been recently posed by Robert K. Garcia (2014). The challenge is 
that there is a gap between properties and the objects that are constituted by 
properties.  How do properties  generate an entity,  in this  case an object,  of  a distinct  
ontic category? Using this account of abstracta, we can answer Garcias challenge as 
follows. In ultimate terms, a concrete particular is composed of abstract components, 
despite the fact that our ordinary (concretive, partitive) mode of decomposition breaks 
concrete particulars down into their concrete parts. A concrete object in relation to its 
abstract components is maximally concrete, whereas its abstract components are 
abstract to a certain degree. This blueness is abstract, but it is more abstract than the 
concurrent sum of this blueness and this shape. At the same time, this concurrent sum 
is more concrete than this blueness. The perfectly abstract components of a concurrent 
sum are its simple components, if there is some fundamental level of perfectly abstract 
components.4 So the abstract/concrete distinction admits of degree and is not an 
absolute divide between entities of two distinct ontic categories. In other words, there 
is no categorial gap between abstracta and concreta. The difference is one of 
mereological complexity. Since there is no categorial gap between abstracta and 
concreta, the gap challenge does not arise. Abstract particulars generate a concrete 
particular in virtue of abstract particulars composing a concurrent sum that exhausts 
its content. Concrete objects are really qualitative complexes mereologically composed 
of simpler qualitative elements. (How and when this sort of composition occurs is 
irrelevant to this resolution of the gap challenge. Perhaps concurrence is adequate. 
Perhaps some other mode of bundling is needed. For a well-cited discussion of this 
issue, see (Simons 1994).)5 
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The power of this concept of a trope lies in the fact that the object/property 
distinction is built up from the abstract/concrete distinction and the 
universal/particular distinction (cf. Forrest 1993, 47). As a result, while tropes are 
qualitative natures, this does not make them qualities or properties, fundamentally 
speaking, because the notion of a property is built up from the notions of abstract and 
particular (throughout, I use the word properties to refer to both qualities and 
relations; thus, what I say about instantiation applies to both qualities and relations). 
Or at least tropes are not at bottom qualities in the ordinary sense of that word, that 
is, the sense that is associated with an entity that qualifies something.6 Furthermore, 
tropes are not objects or substances. The notion of an object is built up from the 
notions of abstract and particular. Particularity is conceptually prior to objecthood. 
Tropes are particulars, and their particularity and abstractness often lead to 
concurrent sums that exhaust their content. These sums are concrete particulars or 
substances. It is a mistake, therefore, to think that tropes are objects or substances 
because they are particulars.7  
There are many other issues concerning the nature of tropes such as the 
individuation and counting of tropes that should be addressed. There are also further 
obstacles pertaining to the concurrence and resemblance of tropes. These topics will be 
put to one side. Our primary concern is the roles that instantiation plays in classical 
trope theory. 
 
2. A Trope-theoretic Account of Instantiation 
In analytic ontology we aim to give an account of how abstract universals are related 
to concrete particulars. This is the perennial problem of how an object can have many 
properties and how a property can be had by many objects. Trope theorists account 
for apparent sameness in nature in terms of similarity among tropes. To illustrate, 
consider this button and that button. Both buttons are blue. They resemble each other 
with respect to color because each button has a blue-trope and each blue-trope 
perfectly resembles the other. Call this blueness b1 and that blueness b2. The fact 
that b1 and b2 resemble each other supervenes on, is grounded in, or is made true by 
the natures of the terms of this resemblance relation-trope. It is therefore internal 
(Campbell 1990, 35-36; Williams 1953a, 8; 1966, 80).  
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What is doing the work here is the fact that tropes are qualitative natures. Trope 
b1 and b2 are of the same kind or universal because b1 and b2 resemble each other (in 
what follows, the terms kind and universal are used interchangeably; thus kinds are 
not necessarily natural kinds, nor are they necessarily determinables). This does not 
imply that the qualitativeness of each trope is determined by the fact that it resembles 
other tropes. Both tropes are of a kind. Trope b1 is of the kind Blue. It would be of its 
kind irrespective of the existence of b2. Further, b1 is not of its kind in virtue of 
having the kind Blue as a constituent. Trope b1 is  a  simple  entity  that  is  primitively  
qualitative (more on this in the next section). 
We are now in a position to understand how the concept of instantiation is 
realized in classical trope theory. Talk of tropes being of a kind is to be understood in 
terms of tropes manifesting kinds.8 What  it  is  for  tropes  to  instantiate  kinds  is  for  
tropes to manifest kinds. Trope b1, for instance, manifests the kind Blue. Instantiation 
is identified with manifestation and instantiation qua manifestation fills the role of a 
trope being of its kind. This is what instantiation means in classical trope theory. 
Instantiation qua manifestation also plays a role in constructing an analysis of 
predication. According to a substance-attribute ontology, a sentence such as a is F 
usually takes the subject a to refer to an object and the predicate  is F to refer to 
the extension of the predicate or the property of being F. Quantificational sentences 
receive a similar treatment. Classical trope theorists junk this analysis and give the 
following alternative (Williams 1963, 616; [1960]1986, 10):  
(CTT-Pred) a is F =df. a embraces an f-trope that manifests the kind F.  
Williams calls this is a double-jointed analysis of predication because it involves 
two distinct but intelligible phases (Williams 1953a, 11; 1966, 82). The first phase 
concerns the abstractive compositionality of the concrete particular in terms of it 
embracing its tropes; the second phase is the manifesting of the relevant tropes kind. 
Embracement has to do with parthood, but with the parts that are of the same content 
as the relevant sum. This blueness and this shape concur in the button, while the 
button embraces this blueness and this shape. Indeed, this button embraces all of its 
abstract parts or components. Concurrent sums can do the same thing. The concurrent 
sum of this blueness and this shape embraces this blueness. A sum might have a part 
that is of a sub-content of its content, but that part is not embraced by the sum. For 
instance, take a car, to use Williamss example ([1960]1986, 5). It is a concrete sum. It 
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has concrete parts such as four tires, a steering column, five seats, and so on. 
Ultimately,  this  car is  a sum of concurrent tropes.  It  can be abstractively analyzed in 
terms of its shape, its weight, its color, and so on. Take the front left tire. It occupies a 
sub-content of the content of the car. This tire is round. It has a round-trope that 
occupies the same sub-content as the tire. This round-trope (of the tire) is part of the 
car, but it is not embraced by the car because this round-trope is not of the same 
content as the car; it is of a sub-content of the content of the car. Thus not every 
abstract part of a concrete particular is a character of that concrete particular. The 
characters of a concrete particular are the tropes that are embraced by that concrete 
particular. 
(CTT-Pred) has two advantages over competing accounts. First, it does away with 
the problematic notion of instantiation that is realized in Platonic and Aristotelian 
theories of universals (Campbell 1990, 42). Platonic realism must account for a 
connection of instantiation between entities of ontically unique realms. As is well 
known, it suffers from vicious regress and the mysteriousness of a relation traversing 
two realms.  Aristotelian realism must account for immanence using the concept of  a 
state of affairs and a non-mereological mode of composition. As Lewis has argued, a 
non-mereological mode of composition seems too much to swallow (Lewis 1986). 
Classical trope theory is not burdened with such obstacles. This button is blue because 
it embraces this blueness and this blueness manifests the kind Blue, and not because 
the button instantiates the universal Blueness or  because  the  state  of  affairs  of  the 
button being blue is non-mereologically composed of this button and being blue. 
Second, (CTT-Pred) provides us with a more accurate account of predication than the 
crude analysis offered by realists because (CTT-Pred) yields a distinction between 
abstract and concrete instances (Williams 1953a, 12; 1966, 83): 
 Abstract instance: this blueness is an abstract instance of the kind Blue.  
 Concrete instance: this button is a concrete instance of the kind Blue.9 
A  universal  is  thereby  in  its  concrete  instances  in  virtue  of  the  trope  being  an  
abstract instance of the universal; the notion of a concrete instance is the relative 
product of embracing and manifesting (Williams 1963, 617). By contrast, the standard 
account of predication, according to realism about universals, is that the concrete 
particular has the abstract universal or rather the object is a token of the type. But, as 
Williams argues, to identify a word, say, with a concrete ink splotch overlooks the 
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subtle fact that the word (in some sense) inheres in the splotch (Williams 1953b, 171; 
1966, 89). Similarly, this button is not a token of the type Blue, but rather its blueness 
is an occurrence of the kind Blue. This has led others such as Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(1970) and E.J. Lowe (2006) to admit the abstract instance/concrete instance 
distinction. For Wolterstorff and Lowe, Socratess wisdom instantiates Wisdom 
(abstract instance) and Socrates exemplifies Wisdom (concrete instance). Bracketing 
the subtleties of their views, Wolterstorff and Lowe have independently latched on to 
the idea that it is not enough to capture the instantiation of a universal at the level of 
the concrete object tout court. 
(CTT-Pred) is an analysis of predication of concrete particulars. It is not an 
analysis of predication of any particular, abstract or concrete. It was introduced to 
explain how abstract universals can be said of concrete particulars. Also, (CTT-Pred) 
has as a background assumption the claim that the predicates of subject-predicate 
sentences and quantificational sentences somehow refer to qualities or relations and 
the claim that the subject or variables refer to concurrent sums of tropes. Classical 
trope theorists  accept that it  might be the case that a certain sentence is  true but not 
because of the existence of the alleged referents of its constituent-terms.  
Furthermore, as Campbell recognizes, there is a more fundamental case of 
predication that involves nothing other than a single trope (Campbell 1990, 41-42). 
The sentences this is (a case of) blue and there is a case of blueness are not subject to 
(CTT-Pred). Instead, each predicate applies directly to each respective trope. The 
predicate in these basic cases applies directly to the relevant trope because of the trope 
and nothing else.  This  can be put more clearly with an explicit  use of  the concept of  
truthmaking. All we need is a minimal commitment to some theory of truthmaking, 
leaving the debate concerning the best theory of truthmaking for another occasion. Let 
us say that if T makes that p true, necessarily if T exists, p is true (Armstrong 1997, 
115). This is not to say that truthmaking is necessitation. Rather, necessitation is a 
condition of truthmaking. Truthmaking can be taken as a primitive term or identified 
with a relation of truthgrounding. If necessitation as a condition of truthmaking is too 
strong or troublesome for some reason, we can stipulate that truthmaking implies 
supervenience. Supervenience would then be the relevant condition of truthmaking.  
Armed with the concept of truthmaking, consider the sentence this is a case of 
blue. It is made true by this blueness because necessarily if this blueness exists, it is a 
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case of Blue. There is no world in which it is a case of some other kind. For other 
predicates that apply to this blueness, this blueness is a sufficient truthmaker. For 
example, it is true that this blueness is particular. The truthmaker for this truth is this 
blueness because necessarily if this blueness exists, it is true that it is particular. There 
is no world in which it is a universal. Consequently, the implementation of 
truthmaking guards against objections that attack the simplicity of (basic) tropes (for 
discussion of the simplicity of tropes, see Maurin 2005).  
(CTT-Pred) is an analysis of how properties are predicated of objects. It builds up, 
as I mentioned in the previous section, the concept of property and object from the 
more fundamental notions of abstract, concrete, universal, and particular. (CTT-Pred) 
allows us to say that whatever fills the predicative-role is of whatever fills the object-
role. Tropes standing in certain relations (as per the relative product of embracing and 
manifesting) fill both roles. So we get to say that a property is of an object and that a 
property characterizes an object. To draw a useful comparison, consider the analysis 
of  change  in  terms  of  qualitative  difference  among  temporal  parts.  On  this  view,  
qualitative difference among temporal parts plays the role of change. We get to say 
that this leaf changes from green to red because qualitative differences of the temporal 
parts of the leaf play the role of change and so deserve the label change. Although 
this is not change in the sense of an enduring substance having different properties at 
different times, four-dimensionalists admit change. They are simply analyzing the 
analysandum differently. Similarly, classical trope theorists admit that tropes 
characterize, are of, or qualify concrete particulars, as per (CTT-Pred). It is not the 
case that abstract particulars do not characterize or qualify objects. It is just that the 
analysandum is analyzed differently, in the same way that change is analyzed 
differently according to the four-dimensionalist. 
 
3. A Defense of Manifestation 
Moreland has raised an objection against the concept of manifestation, which is yet to 
be addressed in the literature. His argument is embedded in a larger critique of 
Wolterstorffs account of universals but it applies to classical trope theory. (Part of the 
reason for this is that Williams and Wolterstorff have similar views: both admit cases 
of kinds and say that universals are kinds.) Moreland argues that the relation of being 
a case of is mysterious (2001, 80-81). His reasons are not directed at the fact that the 
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relation is primitive, but at the concept of the relation. His objection is that he has no 
clear grasp of the concept. He points out correctly that it does not help us to say that 
the relation is analogous to set-membership or that it is a species of the type-token 
relation. He also argues that the relation does not play the role of relating the kind to 
its case. Therefore, it is not only mysterious but inadequate. Since the being a case of 
relation is the manifestation relation for classical trope theorists, Morelands objection 
is that the concept of manifestation is inadequate and mysterious. 
To respond to Morelands objection, we need to demonstrate that the concept of 
manifestation is  not mysterious and explain how a kind is  related to its  trope.  I  will  
accomplish both tasks by first clarifying the concept of manifestation and then 
presenting the classical trope theorists account of universals. To begin, let us 
distinguish the question Why does trope k manifest kind K? from the question How 
does trope k manifest kind K? Why-questions are after an explanation for why a 
certain proposition is true. How-questions concern what roles the entities of our 
theory play as specified by the concepts expressed in the theory.  
Let us start with the why-question. Recall that the (basic) trope is simple. It has no 
constituents. Trope k does not have kind K as a constituent. So why is trope k of the 
kind K? It cannot be because trope k has kind K as a constituent. The only answer 
available is: given trope k, it is of the kind K.  We might say given the nature of  k it 
follows that k is of the kind K, but this is misleading because it implies that tropes 
have natures. If you think tropes have natures, then, like Moreland, you might wonder 
How does a case get its nature? (Moreland 2001, 81). But this is an ill-formed 
question that arises from misunderstanding classical trope theory. A case is its nature. 
It does not come from somewhere else. There is no further proposition that explains 
the proposition that trope k is what it is. And this is as it should be because, according 
to classical trope theory, k and all  other basic  tropes are primitive natures.  The only 
thing objectionable about this part of the theory is that facts about the nature and 
identity of basic tropes are brute. But explanation must stop somewhere, and this is 
where it  stops for classical  trope theory (cf.  Campbell  1990, 30).  Indeed,  for most if  
not all other theories we should expect explanations to bottom out at the ontological 
primitives of the theory. So this is no knock-down criticism. It is nothing more than a 
cost to be noted in the tallying up of our cost-benefit analysis of candidate hypotheses 
in analytic ontology. 
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Let us move on to the how-question. Our task is to give a story about how tropes 
manifest kinds. Strictly speaking, there is no relation of manifestation that relates trope 
k and the kind K. Rather, there is a two-place  manifests  predicate taken as a 
piece of primitive ideology. This predicate does not ontologically commit us to a 
relation. Ontology consists of the values of the bound variables of our theory. Ideology 
is the set of terms of the theory. This common distinction between ideology and 
ontology is due to W.V. Quine (1951). Bits of ideology, like predicates and operators, 
express ideas or concepts  hence, Quines use of the label ideology. Despite the 
allusion to concepts, the terms of the theory are of primary import, and although we 
are ideologically committing ourselves to a predicate, our account of manifestation is 
not semantic or linguistic. Following Theodore Sider (2011), ideology is just as 
important as ontology because they are both worldly. Ontology is worldly in that it is 
about entities out there in the world. Ideology is worldly in that it helps express 
fundamental and nonfundamental facts about the world. A fact, as I use the term, is a 
true proposition. A fundamental fact is a fact that is not explained in terms of further 
facts; a nonfundamental fact is explained in terms of further facts  this account of a 
fundamental fact is not essential to this conception of ideology. A sentence composed 
of primitive terms expresses a fundamental fact. A sentence composed of defined terms 
(even if one or more terms are primitive) expresses a nonfundamental fact. When  
manifests  is saturated with a trope and a kind in the appropriate manner we get the 
sentence trope k manifests kind K. This sentence expresses the fundamental fact that 
trope k manifests kind K.  
The theoretical cost of this is two-fold. We bear the ideological cost of a primitive 
manifests predicate and the conceptual cost of manifestation. The concept and its 
corresponding predicate are characterized as follows. First, the manifests predicate is 
asymmetric. If trope k manifests kind K, kind K cannot manifest trope k. Kinds cannot 
manifest tropes, whereas tropes manifest kinds. Second, trope k is automatically of the 
kind K. In every world where trope k exists,  it  manifests  kind K. So manifestation is 
necessary or essential. Third, manifestation is intrinsic (Williams 1963, 617). It is an 
intrinsic fact that tropes manifest their kinds. Trope k ontically entails kind K.10 
Fourth, manifestation is not transitive. This follows from the fact that for any sentence 
stating a manifestation fact, it must involve a trope manifesting a kind. If trope k 
manifests kind K, kind K cannot manifest some other entity in order to supply the 
12 
 
second premise needed to infer a conclusion about the transitivity of manifestation. 
Fifth, manifestation is internal. Although there is no relation such that it is internal, 
there are relational truths about the manifestation of kinds that require only tropes as 
truthmakers. Indeed, in the case of manifestation, the relation is what Karen Bennett 
calls superinternal (Bennett 2011, 32) or what Campbell calls unilateral (Campbell 
1990, 104). A unilateral or superinternal relation is a relation that requires only one of 
the terms to be its full ground. Using talk of truthmaking, trope k is necessarily 
sufficient to make it true that k manifests kind K.  We  do  not  need  a  relation  of  
manifestation, nor do we need kind K as  a member of  a primitive category of  being.  
These features of manifestation facts and how these facts are accounted for in classical 
trope theory allow us to grasp the concept of manifestation.  
Having now grasped the concept of manifestation, we can understand what kinds 
or universals really are, according to classical trope theory. This in turn will provide an 
explanation of how a kind is related to its trope. For classical trope theorists, 
universals are reductively identified with tropes.11 One  way  that  this  has  been  
expressed by Williams and Campbell is in terms of counting entities. Recall the 
identity of indiscernibles: necessarily, if x and y perfectly resemble each other, then x = 
y. If entity e obeys this principle, e is universal. If not, e is  particular.  Tropes can be 
counted in terms of the denial of the identity of indiscernibles or they can be counted 
in terms of the affirmation of the identity of indiscernibles. The difference between the 
kind Blue and a blue trope is not a difference of category but a difference in rule for 
counting (Campbell 1990, 44, emphasis in original). Since it is not a difference of 
category, there is no ontological difference. We can count tropes one way or count 
them the other way. Either way we are counting tropes and not positing a primitive 
category of universals. The universal is the trope, counted according to the rule: 
perfect similarity entails numerical identity.12  
There are problems with this formulation as it stands. As Moreland notes, talk of 
counting tropes is nothing more than an epistemological story about how we treat 
tropes and identify them as universals. As such, it is not a real theory of universals; it 
does not give us a metaphysics of universals (Moreland 2001, 73). However, this 
formulation can be improved upon in the following way such that it does give us a 
metaphysics of universals.  
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Contra Moreland, the appeal to different rules of counting arises because the 
underlying metaphysics lends itself accordingly. The underlying metaphysics concerns 
the  roles  that  tropes  play.  The  fact  that  tropes  fill  certain  roles  is  a  metaphysical  
matter. Talk of counting tropes comes into the picture because the issue of tropes 
filling certain roles is connected with the meaning of our terms. As Williams says:  
That tropes can enjoy this difference of case though of exactly the same kind, i.e., that 
they do not observe the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, is what we mean by 
saying that they are particulars instead of universals. 
 
What we mean by a universal, I suggest, is an entity or demi-entity which by thus 
pretending to shrink its dimensions to the identity of indiscernibles can be present 
undivided in two or more place-times (1963, 615, emphasis in original). 
Since we are in the business of  stating what particular  and universal  mean, we 
need to specify roles associated with the concept that each term expresses. Then our 
task is to discover the occupant(s) of these roles, suitable role-fillers from our 
ontology. Classical trope theorists posit abstract particulars. Abstract particulars can 
play the role of abstract universals by satisfying the identity of indiscernibles. If tropes 
play the role of universals, tropes are universals.  
This  is  a  case  of  reductive  identification.  To  use  an  analogy,  consider  Lewiss  
formulation of the identity theory of mind (Lewis 1966). He proposed that, as a 
matter  of  analytic  necessity,  mental  state  M  is  defined  in  terms  of  certain  roles  
concerning input and output clauses. Folk psychology embodies the role(s) and the 
meaning of such a mental term, but science discovers that the occupant of such a 
mental role is a neural state. Hence, the mental state is the neural state. Analogously, 
the meaning of the term universal is associated with a certain role  call it R-role. 
This role is such that whatever has perfect similarity entails numerical identity. Tropes 
can fill this role. Thus, universals are tropes. More schematically, following Lewis 
(1972): 
 P1) Universal-entity U = occupant of R-role 
 P2) Trope-entity T = occupant of R-role 
 C) Thus, U = T. 
Although we need to appeal to the relaxing or tightening of the identity conditions 
of our terms, this is due to the entities of our ontology and how they behave, and is 
not grounded in us or our epistemic predicament. Now, if tropes just are universals, 
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manifestation turns out to be a form of identity; hence, instantiation is a form of 
identity.13 The manifestation of the kind in the trope is just the trope playing R-role. A 
kind is related to its trope in virtue of it being identical with its trope. We have thus 
answered Morelands objection. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, I articulated the realization of the concept of instantiation in classical 
trope theory. Instantiation is the manifestation of kinds in tropes. The concept of 
manifestation plays the role of a trope being of its kind and plays a role in accounting 
for predication of concrete particulars. I argued that this account of predication has 
some advantages, but I stopped short of saying it is the superior analysis. I defended 
the concept of manifestation against Moreland by presenting a novel interpretation of 
the classical trope theorists reduction of universals to tropes. Universals just are 
tropes, so manifestation is a form of identity and the manifests predicate is a piece of 
primitive ideology that figures in the expression of fundamental facts about the 
manifestation of tropes. This in turn allowed us to characterize various features of 
manifestation facts and conclude that the concept of manifestation is not mysterious.14 
 
Notes
 
1 Keith Campbell comes closest to Williamss trope theory, but I am hesitant to attribute wholesale the 
view to be articulated in this paper to Campbell because there are subtle differences between Williams 
and Campbell that I do not have space to detail here. Having said that, I will draw freely from 
Campbells work.  
2 Given this account of abstracta, we must deny coincident concrete particulars. Statue-lump cases and 
more complicated examples from physics of fields occupying the same region as concrete objects and 
fundamental particles or quanta occupying the same region will have to be addressed one at a time. 
Unfortunately, there is no space to discuss this issue adequately. It is left for another occasion. 
3 Anna-Sofia Maurin objects that Williams explains abstractness by reference to thinness; thus, his 
understanding of abstract is empty and uninformative (Maurin 2002, 22). However, she fails to 
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identify the right passages in Williamss published work where he gives an account of abstracta in terms 
of an entity failing to exhaust its content. Such an account is not in terms of thinness.  
4 If there is no fundamental level of perfectly abstract entities, we can tweak the theory to account for 
this possibility by taking the dyadic predicate  is more abstract than  as primitive and define up  
is perfectly abstract. Anna Marmodoro calls this possibility qualitative gunk (Marmodoro 2015). 
5 Garcia would say in reply that the notion of concurrence presupposes the notion of an object and a 
specific theory of space and time (Garcia 2014, 124). However, concurrence, like the occupying of a 
particular at some content, is part of analytic ontology, not speculative cosmology; if we need to 
introduce a theory of space and time, the relational theory is adequate; it presupposes particulars, not 
objects, that ground spatiotemporal relation-tropes. A fuller defense of this is reserved for another 
occasion.  
6 As we will see, tropes in certain ways do play the role of an entity that qualifies something in a certain 
sense, but this is not a fundamental fact in our theory. It is something that is analyzed in terms of 
fundamental facts of our theory. The relevant fact here, which is fundamental, is that a trope is 
qualitative.  
7 D.M. Armstrong makes this mistake when he calls tropes junior substances (Armstrong 1989, 115). 
Fredrik Stjernberg commits the same error when he says that tropes are objects because tropes are 
elements of sets, flank the identity sign, and are quantified over (Stjernberg 2003, 39). Garcia describes 
one concept of the trope as a particular-object (Garcia 2015, 142-43). His fault lies in taking the 
object/property distinction as basic.  
8 Talk of manifestation of kinds, universals, characters, qualities, or determinables dates back to W.E. 
Johnson and C.D. Broad. Johnson says occurrents manifest characters, whereas the property of a 
continuant is a group of potential manifestations (Johnson 1924, 86). Broad takes occurrents to be 
manifestations of determinate qualities. A particular blueness, a turquoise, say, is the manifestation of 
Blueness at a certain spacetime region (Broad 1933, 133).  
9 In Necessary Facts Williams calls the concrete instance supermanifestation (Williams 1963, 616). 
For no good reason, I will not employ this term.  
10 Embracing and manifesting are both intrinsic, ontic entailments. (CTT-Pred) is intrinsic and an ontic 
entailment because it is a combination of embracing and manifesting (Williams 1963, 617). Hence, the 
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fact that Socrates is wise is necessary. Williams in one respect bites the bullet: it follows from Socrates 
being a concurrent sum of tropes that Socrates/this concurrent sum entails its components. It is a 
necessary fact, as Williams puts it, that Socrates is wise (Williams 1963, 621-22). However, it does not 
follow that Socrates could not have been unwise, nor does it follow that Socrates is a necessary existent. 
Williams plays down the counter-intuitiveness by pointing out that concrete objects are never given and 
are only inferred or idealized. Our contingent judgments of Socrates do not pick out the complete 
essence of Socrates or him qua that exact concurrent sum of tropes. Ultimately, this issue will turn on 
our theory of essence and whether there are genuine essences of objects or not. Also, our theories of de 
re modal judgments will come into play. These issues, however, are orthogonal to the main subject of 
this paper.  
11 Williams is often misinterpreted as holding the view that universals are sets or classes of similar 
tropes. While some trope theorists are explicit proponents of this view, it is not the view of Williams or 
Campbell. One upshot is that classical trope theorists avoid the problems and objections that come from 
identifying universals with sets or classes. A further upshot of this account is that the category of 
universality is accounted for and not explained away or eliminated. The eliminativist approach is not as 
explanatorily powerful, in the same way that eliminative materialism is less explanatorily powerful than 
the identity theory of mind. 
12 Williams further explains how we perceive and conceive abstract universals in concrete particulars by 
appealing to abstraction and generalization. To perceive or conceive an abstract universal in a concrete 
particular we need to first abstract the relevant trope from the concrete particular and then generalize it, 
that is, treat perfectly similar tropes as a repeatable. While this explanation is valuable for 
understanding how we grasp the concept of a universal in virtue of superimposing generalization on 
abstraction, I will not go into the details here because they are not directly relevant in this paper. 
13 For a similar theory of universals according to which instantiation is a form of identity, see (Baxter 
2001). 
14 Thanks to Javier Cumpa, Peter Forrest, Jani Hakkarainen, Markku Keinänen, and Gonzalo 
Rodriguez-Pereyra for comments and discussion.  I also thank the audience of the Nature of 
Instantiation stream at the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of Adelaide, 3 
July 2017. 
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